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Technology and Terrorism: 
The New Threat for the Millennium 
Stephen R. Bowers and Kimberly R. Keys 
INTRODUCTION 
In the post-Second World War era, terrorism emerged as one of the more 
significant aspects of low intensity conflict. While historians can trace 
terrorism back to the efforts of the 'Zealots' to break Roman rule over 
Palestine in the year AD 66, most analysts regard it as a relatively new 
phenomenon. As such, it has posed special problems not only for the security 
of nations but has also threatened the very foundations of democratic society 
by disrupting popular confidence in institutions. Terrorism has emerged as a 
standard tactic to be used in low intensity conflict. M. L. R. Smith contends 
that terrorism is becoming the norm in societies that are not technologically 
advanced and are still struggling with democratisation. 1 Unfortunately, many 
contemporary examples of the use of terrorism, especially in the case of 
Bosnia, seem to prove his point. 
Complacency is one of the more consistent human traits and, by the latter 
part of the decade, some scholars have begun to speculate that terrorism, as a 
critical international factor, is on the wane. This assumption can be bolstered 
by statistics indicating a decade-long decline in. the number of terrorist 
incidents; yet those statistics mask a more significant fact. The most important 
point about any analysis of terrorism at the end of the century is that while 
the number of incidents are down the lethality of the terrorist potential has 
risen to a frightening degree. The key to this ominous development is found 
in the overwhelming technological progress of late 20th century society.2 
Technology, defined as the application of scientific knowledge to human 
problems, has contributed greatly to our ability to deal with situations in such 
a way as dramatically to alter the course of our existence and has challenged 
traditional state centric views of reality. It is modern technology to which we 
give credit for almost every improvement in medicine, nutrition, education, 
and our general standard of living. Technology has changed the nature of 
relations among nations and within them. Yet it is this same technology which 
has affected the nature of the life-threatening hostilities of the past century. 
As the most primitive weapons have been replaced with sophisticated, silent, 
and deadlier ones, technology clearly receives the credit. Technological 
innovations force us to consider the role that non-traditional, namely non-
state and transnational actors play in threatening our security. As will he 
demonstrated in the following examination, the emergence and active 
proliferation of computer, biological, and chemical terrorism is a consequence 
of technological innovations. In all three of these, technology is an intervening 
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variable that has made each threat more signifi~ant. The. eme.rgence of the 
computer as a technological device associated .~Ith terronsm IS a very .n~w 
phenomenon while chemical and biological mUl1ltIOI~S, though of recent onglI~, 
have been recognised as weapons of mass destructIOn for much lon~er. It IS 
recent technological innovations which have made .them mo~e vIable .as 
weapons. Th~ sheer volume of s~ch activities and .thelr destruc:lve ,PotentIal 
makes terrorIsm more problematIc, harder to mOl1ltor, and more dIfficult to 
deter. 
New terrorist tools 
Technology has had a great impact on the development of the terrorist thre~ts 
emerging since the end of the Second World War. Access to new ~e~rorlst 
tools, the broadening of the terrorist market, and the. a~vent of SOphls~Icate.d 
and readily available computer technologies are all sIgl1lficant factors 111 thIS 
evolving threat. With the passage of time and. t?e a?Va~lcement of ~~merous 
technological innovations, such as the m111IatunsatIOn, po~'tablhty ~nd 
increased precision of weapons, and the spin off of technology 111tO. a vanety 
of other domains, the tools of the terrorist became less expensIve, more 
destructive, and widely available through less secure non-governme!ltal outlets. 
In the early 1970s, public awareness of this development ~as helghten~d by 
news that a college undergraduate, using open source matenals, had deSIgned 
a nuclear explosive device. In fact, with the exception of the necessary small 
quantity of uranium, the student had produced a fully workable nuclear 
bomb. Subsequent reports about the ease with which this substance could be 
acquired further stimulated fe~rs about a changing terrorist threat. . . 
These important technologIcal tools have been augmented b~ sIgl1lficant 
motivational factors. Among the most important of these,. a.ccord111~ to Br~ce 
Hoffman, are the resurgence of terrorism motivated by r.ehgI~n, the 111crea~111g 
amateurisation of terrorism, and the enhanced professIOnahsm of terronsts. 
Today's terrorists, Hoffman writes, are more 'adept in t?eir t~~~ecraft of de.ath 
and destruction; more formidable in terms of theIr abIhtIes of ta~tIcal 
modification'.3 Thus, access to new tools, a broadened supply of avaIlable 
terrorist goods, and the advent of computer technologi~s are not the onl!, 
critical developments to increase the nature of the terronst threat .. In fact, It 
may well be that the 'soft' motivational factors make the technologIcal factor 
more deadly.4 
In the past, general attitudes towards terrorist beha~iour we.re based ~n .the 
belief that terrorist groups were operating on assumptIOns whIch were SImIlar 
to those of conventional political actors. The terrorists l?resumably understo?d, 
therefore, that there was an accepted threshold for VIOlence and proceed111g 
beyond that was to invite. massive offici~l retaliat.ion. The app~a~ance of non-
state terrorist actors motIvated by ethl1lc or raCIst ha~red, re!IgI?US zeal and 
apocalyptic visions of mass destruction has resulted 111 a re]ectI?n o~ those 
unspoken 'rules of the game'. For many of these groups, exceSSIve vIOlen~e 
performs a redemptive purpose and, b~cause they are non-state actors, th.elr 
apprehension by law enforcement agencIes cannot be taken for granted. Unhke 
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the more traditional terrorists, the activities of these groups are much less 
likely to be media-driven. 
The 'silent terrorist' 
One of the most consistent actions immediately following terrorist events of 
past decades was the predictable demand for credit by the group responsible 
for that event. More recently, however, major terrorist actions have been 
followed by silence as no group announced its responsibility or a shadowy, 
previously unknown group claimed to have committed the act. Several 
incidents have fallen into this category: the destruction of Pan Am Flight 103 
over Lockerbie in 1988, the downing of Air India Flight 182 over the Atlantic 
in 1985, the Atlanta Olympics bombing in 1996, and the Khobar Tower 
bombing in Saudi Arabia are some of the most notable. The emergence of a 
new 'silent terrorist' creates an even greater climate of fear because of the 
uncertainty over motivations. Not knowing the identity or motivations of the 
terrorist group means greater difficulty in predicting the next target. The 
immediate uncertainty surrounding the identity of the perpetrator of the 
Khobar Tower bombing resulted in considerable tension between the US, and 
its allies and also exacerbated tensions between the US and Islamic nations 
suspected of complicity in the event. Such post-incident confusion and 
uncertainty about the actual perpetrator make cases like this even more 
troubling. 5 
An additional factor complicating the terrorist threat has been the 
proliferation of 'markets' at which individuals and organisations can purchase 
sophisticated weaponry previously either available only through limited official 
channels or completely unavailable. The deterioration and collapse of the 
former Soviet Union has resulted in a dramatic broadening of the range of 
available weapons. Throughout the region, vendors at open-air bazaars have 
begun to offer attractive and expensive western products for civilian use as 
well as deadly but inexpensive military weapons. Everything from hand 
grenades to rocket launchers can be purchased by customers with hard 
currency. More importantly, senior military commanders with access to 
advanced nuclear weapons, facing the prospect of lost income following the 
economic collapse of their employers, have been increasingly inclined to sell 
the instruments of mass destruction for which there is a ready and eager 
market. 
It is not the weapons and the actions of the former Soviet Union alone 
which have heightened fears of an enlarged threat. There is a veritable flood 
of materials which support chemical and biological capabilities from which 
would-be terrorists can draw. Countries like Iraq and Iran routinely receive 
the precursor materials which support the development of these terrorist 
technologies. While we decry the availability of deadly Soviet technologies, 
western nations like the United States have also contributed to this situation. 
For example, a biological agent repository in Bethesda, Maryland actually 
allowed the transfer of anthrax to the Iraqi authorities in 1986. 
While new weapons technologies and a flood of sophisticated Soviet 
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weapons enhanced the destructive potential of the terrorist, other technological 
innovations have made society more vulnerable. The 1980s saw a phenomenal 
expansion of computer technologies and the introduction of the computer 
into almost every aspect of our lives. By the present decade, computer 
networks have effectively linked banks, businesses, government, universities 
and almost every national institution into an elaborate and, in many ways, 
delicate network. Such devices have done much to bring about the globalisation 
of societies which are intimately linked into an electronic superstructure that 
reduces cultural divisions. Consequently, terrorists attempting to attack targets 
in this global community cannot limit the impact of their actions to one 
particular group or facet of society. In this larger social entity everyone 
becomes at least part of the terrorist target. 
The operational nature of computer technology has greatly enhanced the 
power of actors who would use this innovation to threaten society. As a result 
of the organisation of sophisticated 'client-server' technologies, a great amount 
of processing power can be transferred to the client and away from ~he 
provider's central controls and security regulations. Consequently, terronsts 
now have a ready target whose capabilities can be transformed into weapons 
against the very society which created the technology being used to disrupt its 
orderly functioning. 
A new type of terrorist 
As a result of these developments, there are countless new possibilities for a 
completely different kind of terrorist. In the traditional view, the terrorist is 
an extremist motivated by some political, ethnic, or sociological grievance and 
working with others who share this outlook. We understand the terrorist, we 
believe, by examining group motivations. By learning to identify the signatu~es 
of terrorist behaviour, we can make realistic projections about future terronst 
actions. We can also understand the relationship between events such as, for 
example, the expansion of Israeli settlements and possible terrorist strikes 
against targets in Israel. In general, analysts have placed terrorism within the 
framework of studies of nationalism, the activities of certain dictatorial 
regimes, or radical ideologies such as Islamic fundamentalism. 
This analytical approach has been supported by academic research on 
terrorism which was averse to operational demands of agencies charged with 
combating the terrorist threat. Academics have been interested in explaining 
broad trends in terrorist violence and have focused on incident-based research 
as the basis for generating knowledge about such trends. Consequently, they 
have examined terrorism primarily within the broader field of general theories 
of violence. Specific terrorist actions were viewed largely as the subject matter 
for case studies for examining theories of violence. In doing this, academic 
specialists drew from the fields of sociology and other disciplines which 
focused on group behaviour.6 
There has been an apparent reluctance within the academic community to 
approach terrorism within a context that would be useful to the government 
officials dealing with this problem. These counter-terrorist (CT) analysts and 
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operational planners were faced with the problem of identifying . and 
forecasting future terrorist threats. In an effort to interdict these, CT planners 
needed to look beyond the theoretical analysis of an incident and treat the 
group as an organisational entity. To understand the behaviour, both present 
and future, of a terrorist organisation is to understand its ideology, formation, 
recruitment and training patterns and to identify its likely targets .. 
TERRORISM AND THE COMPUTER 
The benefits of technology are being realised by a new breed of terrorist, the 
cyber-terrorist, who uses lawlessness to achieve aims through the exploitation 
of computerised systems deployed by the target. 7 The terrorists of the 
immediate Second World War era faced numerous challenges in their efforts 
to communicate. All too often, they had to resort to cut-outs, dead drops, 
hidden messages and other relatively slow and primitive devices, each of which 
carried with it risks of detection, delay, or misunderstanding. Modern, 
computer driven telephone systems offer both the average citizen and the 
terrorist a quick and effective means of communication. Cellular phones have 
been especially valuable in easing the burdens of communication for 
individuals on the move. 
Terrorist recruitment and training 
The computer has been particularly useful to terrorist groups for recruitment 
and has made possible the careful investigation of volunteers. It is among 
them that infiltrators are most likely to be found and, with the aid of 
computerised records, individual backgrounds can be checked before the 
admission of new members to sensitive positions. Groups wanting to infiltrate 
their own agents into different organisations can also rely upon the computer 
to create more effective and verifiable cover stories to deceive agencies 
conducting background investigations. For the genuinelY sophisticated terrorist, 
the computer is a tool for training and planning. By creating computer 
models of targets, it is possible to have an advance 'virtual walk-through' of 
facilities selected for terrorist operations.8 
In what we now think of as the 'computer age', it is not only groups but 
also lone individuals who can pose a great threat to the security of institutions 
and even nations. While not arousing the fears of mass destruction associated 
with biological and chemical weapons, cyber-terrorism is joining conventional 
terrorism as a significant threat to the security of our institutions and the 
computer hacker stands alongside the terrorist cell as a phenomenon whose 
actions and motivations must be understood. However, unlike the more 
traditional terrorist who was vulnerable because of the demands of fund-
raising, recruitment, and security, the cyber-terrorist operates in a much more 
risk-free environment and never has to come into the open to engage in such 
activities as arson, ,assassinations, hostage-taking, or kidnappings. Cyber-
terrorism has thus emerged as an attractive terrorist option for several reasons. 
First, danger to the terrorist himself is limited. The acquisition, training, and 
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staging of weapons deployed against a target does not exist in cyber-terrorism 
as in traditional terrorism. Additionally, computers have no physical 
protection, such as mylan sheathing or large barricades, a convenient omission 
which facilitates the success of an attack. Third, risk of capture and arrest are 
limited. In fact, a cyber-terrorist has the opportunity to learn from past 
mistakes, thus improving his skills. Equally troubling is the fact that we have 
fewer tools and much less experience for dealing with this terrorist threat and 
analysts have few tested, refined models which might guide responses. 
National security 
For cyber-terrorists, the inherent vulnerability of information systems creates 
an opportunity which can be exploited with surprising ease. This opportunity 
is the result of a market in which 'information brokers' now play an essential 
role in almost every aspect of business, politics, and science. For such 
operations, data is a commodity whose value is based on the traditional 
assumption that knowledge is power. In this environment, the skilled hacker 
can destroy the power base of an advanced society by sabotaging the data 
stored on its computers. Furthermore, recognising knowledge as power, 
information warfare may become another important category of low intensity 
conflict which must be considered as an important national security factor. 
The many linkages between military and the less secure civilian information 
systems gives this development a special relevance for national security. 
Initially conceived as an instrument to facilitate military command and 
control functions, what we now know as the Internet was created as the result 
of an initiative by the US Department of Defense. Given the expense of 
computers and the geographical dispersion of individuals involved in defence 
related research, the DOD set out to create linkages between distant 
computers. Eventually, an unclassified network was created and, as a result of 
the early success of interactive computing, there was great pressure from 
universities, non-military research scientists, and private groups involved in 
work with computers. By the mid-1980s, the National Science Foundation had 
effectively linked five major computers and what eventually became known as 
the Internet was in operation. Within a few years, thousands of other 
networks were connected and interactive computing had become as common 
as the morning commute to the office and, in an increasing number of cases, 
was actually replacing it. 
Since computers serve as more than repositories for data, but also play a 
vital role in the performance of an infinite variety of functions, the orderly 
operation of this electronically connected society is very much at stake. 
According to Arnaud DeBorchgrave of the Center for Strategic and 
International Studies, during recent tests, computer specialists have demon-
strated an ability to crash the computer systems of both the New York Stock 
Exchange and the social security system. Moreover, according to Arnaud 
DeBorchgrave, 80 per cent of the Fortune 500 companies have been 
electronically penetrated by hackers. 9 
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THE CYBER-TERRORIST POTENTIAL 
In 1993, terrorists created a great panic in New York City with an attack on 
the World Trade Center. As the most visible instance of foreign terrorism on 
US soil, this event heightened American fears of the terrorist potential. Yet 
the incident had a direct impact on only a small number of people and the 
actual damage was minimal. The cyber-terrorist potential extends far beyond 
what was seen in the attack on the World Trade Center and even the more 
destructive and deadly strike in Oklahoma City two years later. With a cyber-
terrorist attack, the damage is devastating on a totally different dimension. 
The World Trade Center attack was conducted by individuals utilising 
traditional terrorist technology and, in their efforts to gain entry to the 
Center, they exposed themselves to detection and, eventually, arrest. The 
cyber-terrorist, however, has no need to drive into underground parking 
garages or disable conventional alarm systems in order to disrupt powerful 
institutions. All major financial transactions, banks, stock exchanges, and 
economic structures are driven or linked by computer networks. The networks 
can be penetrated by physically remote terrorists who can destroy popular 
confidence in a nation's economic system and thereby inflict a different kind 
of damage and affect more people than conventional terrorists who cause 
disruptions with poison gas, bombs, or bullets. The key point .is ~ot ~hat one 
kind of damage is more significant than another. The loss of hfe IS dIsastrous 
in a manner that brings about great personal grief. The damage to national 
security data stored within compartmentalised information systems or to 
citizens' financial data stored in an electronically accessed bank account is 
also disastrous but on a different level. Given the transition of post-industrial 
societies into a new type of revolution the information revolution - the 
nature of damage to critical knowledge and information systems is 
exceptionally destructive to societies which have become dependent on these 
new technologies. All types of damage are costly and present problems for 
each afflicted popUlation. The most important concern at this juncture in the 
development of terrorism is to recognise that terrorist activities can result in a 
much greater variety of types of damage to individuals and to society. 
Targeting human systems 
The ability of the cyber-terrorist to disrupt the normal economic functions of 
a modern state is matched by his ability to destroy popular confidence in 
infrastructures which are essential to human life and our technologically 
advanced life style. Because computers control the processing systems of 
numerous factories throughout the post-industrialised nations of North 
America and Western Europe, the cyber-terrorist can gain access to computers 
that determine sensitive and precise levels of nutrients in many food products. 
Consequently, millions of consumers could easily be sickened be~ause of 
minuscule alterations in familiar and trusted products. Cyber-terronsts have 
the potential to target the health industry, the infrastructures of our civil 
society, the financial systems, our transportation networks, systems of public 
safety, our communications infrastructure, the environment, and national 
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military organisations. In the United States, emergency 911 systems have been 
effectively shut down by individuals. In short, no service, system, or institution 
is beyond the reach of skilled criminals determined to bring about havoc. 
'Information warfare' 
The actions of the cyber-terrorist may have many impacts. One of the most 
significant is that the computer is now recognised as an instrument of war 
and can be used to fulfil important military objectives for both conventional 
and terrorist forces. The term which embodies this general concept is 
'information warfare'. Lessons learned from cyber-terrorist actions are being 
incorporated into contemporary information warfare strategies. There is a 
general acceptance of the argument that an important aim of warfare is to 
affect an adversary's information systems. Controlling inputs into his decision-
making process is one way in which the enemy's perceptions and actions can 
be influenced. lo Since almost all vital information is now retrieved, processed, 
and stored with the aid of the computer, intrusion into the computer system 
gives any aggressor the capability of directing his adversary's behaviour in 
such a way as to ensure his defeat. 
An additional impact is the flood of terrorist group sites on the world wide 
web. This has transformed the computer into a terrorist instrument for 
advertising and recruiting. Many groups now routinely maintain a computer 
home page. Through this site they can advance their beliefs as part of a 
propaganda effort and attempt to attract converts. The home page also 
provides clues as to their interests and, because other groups read this page, 
the computer thus aids the group in communicating with others who share 
their interests. It has become apparent that via the computer, groups are now 
able to share technologies that are employed in terrorist actions. 
BIOLOGICAL TERRORISM 
Another demonstration of the degree to which technology has transformed 
the terrorist threat is the emergence of biological terrorism. Few weapons 
inspire greater fear than those biological warfare (BW) agents which have 
appeared not only on the modern battlefield but also in discussions about 
current terrorist activities. As one of the weapons of mass destruction 
associated with the newest and most threatening of terrorist groups, biological 
weapons challenge conventional modes of thinking about the contemporary 
terrorist threat. Previously, there was a major psychological barrier to the use 
of such weapons of mass destruction against civilian populations. The idea of 
such an action was regarded as so distasteful that no group seemed seriously 
to consider it. In March, 1995, however, this barrier was broken when a 
Japanese group employed a deadly chemical nerve agent against civilians 
riding the Tokyo subway. After that incident, traditional assumptions about 
an aversion to the use of weapons of mass destruction against civilians were 
abandoned. 
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A deadlier agent 
Although military planners often use the term 'bio-chemical' to designate a 
single class of weapons, biological and chemical devices are significantly 
different instruments. First, biological agents are much deadlier than their 
chemical counterparts and their utilisation is likely have long-lasting effects 
and to result in a much greater death toll. II The lethality of biological 
weapons is such that 109 of anthrax spores could produce the same death toll 
as a ton of a chemical nerve agent like sarin. The US Congress' Office of 
Technology Assessment estimates that, if it were dispersed by an efficient 
aerosol generator, 100kg of anthrax could produce over 1m deaths in a 
city the size of Washington, DC. 12 Second, while the physiological and medical 
effects of chemical weapons are well defined, those of biological agents are 
very broad and more difficult to treat. Third, modern military organisations 
have developed some skill in detecting the use of chemical weapons, but it is 
much more difficult to determine if biological weapons have been deployed in 
a battlefield environment. US troops in the Gulf War, while trained for dealing 
with chemical threats, had no operational capability to detect the presence of 
biological agents. The first biological detection instruments were not 
introduced in this theatre of operations until February 1998, when the threat 
of renewed fighting prompted new concerns about this danger. The fact that 
the US has achieved only limited success in the development of such 
instruments means that little has been accomplished in terms of providing 
protection against this special danger. The main problem is that there are 
numerous potential biological agents - approximately 60 - which may be 
introduced, each of which requires special detection measures. Consequently, 
the most effective method of preparation for a biological threat is to maintain 
a stockpile with a wide range of medical products which could mitigate the 
effectiveness of biological agents. 13 While it would seem prudent to develop an 
indications and warning system to prepare for and respond to a biological 
threat before its implementation, little has been done to undertake such a 
measure. 
Historical antecedents 
Despite the fact that we often discuss BW as a modern phenomenon, this 
concept can draw upon several historical antecedents. Historians note that in 
the 14th century, the Tatars catapulted plague-infested corpses over the city 
walls of Kaffa, a besieged city in the south-west Ukraine, as a way of spreading 
disease among the defenders. The tactic was both effective and economical. 
During the French and Indian Wars of the 17th century, English soldiers gave 
Indians blankets which had been exposed to the smallpox virus. The resultant 
smallpox epidemic enabled the English to win an important military victory. 
Water supplies were polluted with dead bodies by Roman troops 2,000 years 
ago as well as by Confederate troops during the American Civil War. The 
early 20th century saw more ambitious applications of BW tactics. The 
Japanese tested biological weapons on prisoners of war and sparked an 
epidemic of bubonic plague in China and Manchuria by spreading flea 
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infested debris over major cities in the region. Alerted by the Japanese 
programmes, the British selected an island off the Scottish coast to conduct 
biological experiments with anthrax. They evidently had considerable success 
in creating lethal substances but much less in developing decontamination 
measures. As a result, over 60 years later the island is still completely off 
limits. These lessons seem to have had a cautionary impact on the conduct of 
operations during the Second World War and, with a few notable exceptions, 
biological weapons did not play a significant role. 14 The most significant 
exception relates to activities of the Japanese during their occupation of 
China. According to numerous accounts, Japanese medical personnel stationed 
in Harbin, China subjected American, Chinese, Korean, British, and Soviet 
prisoners of war to experiments involving the bubonic plague and other 
illnesses. Over the course of several years, an estimated 4,000 prisoners died 
as a result of these experiments and, at the end of the war, Japanese military 
officials attempted to destroy all traces of their operations. Similar experiments 
took place at Japanese POW camps in Manchuria. 15 
Modern biological warfare 
In the post-Second World War era, technology began to have a significant 
impact on the utilisation of what is, in fact, an ancient method of coercion. 
No longer a casually employed or spontaneous tactic left to the discretion of 
battlefield commanders, biological warfare was studied at national level 
and factories were established for the purpose of either creating new biological 
weapons or determining how to counter an adversary's biological arsenal. Our 
infatuation with these weapons was such that, in at least one instance, a 
biological weapon was designed for the explicit purpose of killing Fidel 
Castro. 
Over the years the former Soviet Union devoted a great portion of its 
scientific energies to the production of an enormous arsenal of biological 
warfare instruments for use in possible military confrontations with its 
adversaries. Despite denials of involvement in any such programme, the Soviet 
effort to produce militarily usable biological instruments was intense. Even 
though the former USSR signed the Biological Weapons Convention, which 
called for a rejection of these weapons, President Boris Yeltsin eventually 
acknowledged that this agreement was routinely violated. The largest 
production facility was located in Stepnagorsk, Kazakhstan, but, during the 
1970s and 1980s, approximately 20 others were situated elsewhere in the 
former USSR. Soviet surrogates such as East Germany were also actively 
involved in BW research. The Stepnagorsk factory existed for the sole purpose 
of producing bombs and missiles loaded with anthrax. Biological warheads 
were even installed on one version of the SS-ll intercontinental ballistic 
missiles that were targeted against the United States. Although Stepnagorsk is 
now closed, there are reports that three or four similar plants are still in 
operation in Russia. 16 In 1998, when Kanatjan Alibekov, a Russian scientist 
who once served as Deputy Chief of the Main Biopreparat in Vector, Russia, 
made such an assertion, the Russian Foreign Ministry was quick to deny that 
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Russia has continued to develop biological weapons under the cover of 
defensive research. Alibekov maintained that as late as 1992, he was involved 
in directing decisions to strike American cities first with biological weapons. 17 
In 1978, Georgi Markov, a Bulgarian defector working for the BBC, was 
the victim of a biological weapon designed in Soviet laboratories. This incident 
called attention to the former USSR's use of such devices as tools for 
assassination. Accounts of fighting in Afghanistan and, more recently, 
Chechnya, provide evidence of the Soviets' technological advances and 
apparent willingness to use those deadly devices as instruments of mass 
destruction. As the former Soviet arsenal is now being dispersed to the world's 
highest bidders during Russia's new struggle not for world conquest but 
simply for survival, security planners have been required to devote greater 
attention to the possible emergence of a wider biological terrorist threat. In 
late 1997, the Russian government apparently entered into secret agreements 
with Iran to sell a portion of their biological arsenal, thus contributing to the 
further destabilisation of the Middle East. 18 
Warfare becomes terror 
Eventually, most world leaders recognised the risks of biological warfare and 
the commitment to avoid its use became almost universal. With this 
development, biological weaponry came to be regarded as the exclusive tool 
of regimes outside the community of civilised nations. Biological warfare, as a 
concept, had been transformed into biological terror. The collapse of the 
former Soviet Union and the sudden availability of its many weapons 
represented an early warning that biological terrorism had emerged as a new 
and more sinister threat to the security of those institutions upon which we 
depend for our security and well-being. 
In February 1998, security specialists and the general public alike were 
alarmed by reports that two US citizens had been arrested while in possession 
of what was initially thought to be a deadly portion of anthrax. These reports 
heightened awareness of the pervasive nature of technologically advanced 
weaponry now in the hands not only of various governments but also of 
terrorists of every ideological or political persuasion. This chilling incident 
occurred at a time of growing concern about the possibility that Iraq might 
use BW as a way to fulfil its national aspirations, thus elevating biological 
terrorism to the level of a national policy. 
The international biological threat is heightened by the fact that such 
weapons are remarkably cheap and easy to produce. The most significant 
danger of the Cold War was the result of confrontations between the rich 
and/or powerful nations. However, in the world of biological terror, possible 
combatants can be found among the ranks of the impoverished and less 
powerful who aspire to force political and economic change with these 
relatively new and inexpensive weapons. While the United States and other 
western nations terminated offensive BW programmes after 1969, many 
nations have found these to be affordable, devastatingly effective, and, 
therefore, irresistible instruments for their national arsenals. The fact that 
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biological weapons may be directed against a wide range of targets further 
enhances their attractiveness. Convenient targets may include military 
organisations, military dependants, unsuspecting civilians, livestock, or even 
crops. Equally appealing is the stealth with which biological agents can be 
deployed. A nation may be under attack for weeks or months without 
realising it. After all, disease is a routine part of the human condition, so the 
first suspect is nature rather than a political adversary. 
The ease of production of biological agents is such that not only nations 
but also non-state actors can produce them effectively. The required technology 
is commonly available, relatively unsophisticated, and rarely falls into the 
category of highly classified data to which general access is denied. As a 
result, any consideration of BW threats must take into account the possible 
actions of both nation states and terrorist groups which may not be affiliated 
to state agencies. Biological terror need not be state sponsored in the 
contemporary technological environment. 
The potential for biological terrorism 
Modern technology's most important contribution to the development of 
biological weaponry has been the improvement of weaponisation. In past 
centuries, BW was often conducted but its instruments were crude and, in 
terms of logistics, rather limited. Tossing a plague-infested body over the 
ramparts may have been extremely intimidating and very effective but 
biological warriors could not always count on having a ready supply of 
appropriately infected corpses. By the late 20th century, because of 
technological applications, deadly biological substances can be produced in a 
concentrated form and are easily transported. Neither availability nor delivery 
represents a logistical challenge today. 
The assumption of traditional terrorism was that a small number of 
casualties would have a dramatic impact on the much larger general audience. 
The real targets of terrorism were those who witnessed the horrors rather 
than those whose deaths may have resulted from a terrorist incident. The 
terrorists' primary objective, we assumed, was to undermine popular 
confidence in the system rather than to kill large numbers of people. The 
development of modern technology, especially in the area of biological 
weapons, has changed this and contemporary terrorists can think in terms of 
killing very large numbers of people in a single action. 
The emergence of biological terror as a threat signals the arrival of a new 
kind of terrorist who, unlike the traditional one, does not feel the need for 
public recognition and is not driven by the media. This new terrorist, 
according to Dr. Jerold Post, a prominent profiler of terrorists, is more likely 
to be motivated by a desire to cleanse society as an expression of either 
religious zeal or ethnic hatred. Such an individual is less concerned about 
simply calling attention to a political or sociai demand and is more inclined 
to undertake mass killings in order to bring about the destruction rather than 
the reform of society. He is unlikely to espouse the standard political agenda 
common to terrorists of past decades. 19 
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Equally significant is the fact that biological weapons, in contrast to the 
highly touted 'smart bombs' of the 1990s, lack the precision valued by military 
planners. They depend upon environmental conditions and if these are not 
ideal, dispersion is difficult if not impossible to predict. The value of such 
instruments lies in their ability to bring about a death toll numbered in the 
tens or hundreds of thousands rather than the smaller numbers associated 
with conventional weapons. Consequently, lacking dual utility, they can be 
employed only under specific strategic circumstances when the primary 
objective is mass terror. 
However, while lacking in precision, these weapons do enjoy flexibility. With 
reasonably skilful biological engineering, it is possible to devise and deliver 
biological substances which are less than lethal. Consequently, while we 
usually speak of biological terror, biological sabotage is also a possibility. Not 
wishing to inflict devastating losses on a target population, BW planners may 
simply incapacitate an adversary to the extent necessary to accomplish specific 
military objectives. Perhaps an epidemic of mild flu will satisfy their strategic 
needs better than a full scale attack of the plague. Thus, it is important to 
note that 'doomsday' scenarios are not the only ones utilised in planning 
for BW 
The proliferation of biological weapons has quickly assumed proportions to 
rival the spread of nuclear weapons. It is, perhaps, this factor which makes 
the BW threat most significant. According to recent reports, the list of nations 
possessing biological weapons now includes, in addition to Russia, Iraq, Iran, 
China, North Korea, Egypt, Syria, Taiwan, Israel, and Pakistan. 2o The threat 
lies not in the length of this list but in the fact that many of these nations 
reject the political and territorial status quo and are more likely to use such 
weapons to advance an aggressive agenda. 
Biological agents do, however, have important limitations. Among the most 
feared is anthrax. While it is extremely lethal and has an 80 per cent mortality 
rate, it is not contagious. Victims, therefore, must be directly exposed to it. It 
is also important to recognise that while many people have expressed fears 
that anthrax or other biological agents might be introduced into a community's 
water supply, such a tactic generally results in a significant dilution of their 
effectiveness. Therefore, we can conclude that the vulnerability of modern 
society is somewhat over-estimated. In fact, some analysts suggest that 
biological weapons have never been employed by terrorists or, perhaps, even 
by states. There have been threats regarding the use of biological agents but 
most of these have turned out to be hoaxes. 21 Finally, while there are 'anti-
status quo' states which possess such munitions, there are important arguments 
which deter them from their use. Most compelling is that biological weapons 
are indiscriminate and difficult to direct, contain, or control. Biological agents, 
with their capacity to reproduce themselves, may well bring about unpredictable 
and devastating results. Consequently, the 'terrorist states' realise that their 
own troops might well be devastated by these weapons because of something 
so mundane as a shift in the direction of the wind. In a similar fashion, non-
state terrorists are aware of the frightening personal risks they face in handling 
biological weapons and are likely to choose another less risky option. 
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Moreover, terrorists have found themselves increasingly successful in achieving 
their goals without resorting to the actual use of these terrible weapons. 
CHEMICAL WEAPONS 
Closely related to biological weapons and equally impacted by the development 
of technology, chemical weapons first attracted attention on the battlefields of 
the 20th century. While the production process for chemical weapons is much 
longer than that of biological weapons, they can be designed to kill much 
faster. Our first experiences with chemical weapons were during the First 
World War when mustard gas acquired its reputation as one of the most 
brutal and inhumane of modern weapons. In spite of the widespread horror 
with which most people responded to reports of the effects of mustard gas, 
by the Second World War most nations had considerable experience in 
studying and developing a variety of chemical agents. 
Binary weapons 
One of the most significant events in the evolution of terrorism has been the 
development of binary weapons. Such a device is a chemical weapon for 
which individual precursor components may be stored separately. When the 
elements are combined there is a qualitative change in which essentially 
harmless substances are transformed into an agent of great lethality. The 
binary weapon eases the storage risks for terrorists and, with proper 
engineering, enables the terrorist to remove himself from the scene of an 
imminent chemical terrorist incident. 
The development of the binary weapon has taken place just as counter 
terrorist activity has become more effective in dealing with the traditional 
terrorist methods. Hi-jacking, bombing, and kidnapping, those routine tactics 
employed by terrorists since the advent of terrorism as a phenomenon, are no 
longer as effective as in the past. Groups relying on them face an increasing 
risk of detection and apprehension. It is, therefore, ironic that the success of 
counter terrorist forces in suppressing the use of conventional weapons now 
forces terrorists to give renewed consideration to chemical weapons. 
Chemical agents 
Numerous chemical agents, perhaps thousands of them, are of potential value 
to terrorists. Insecticides and herbicides are prominent in this category as are 
broad groups of substances which may be categorised as choking agents such 
as chlorine, blistering agents, nerve agents, and blood agents such as hydrogen 
cyanide. Blood agents are poorly suited for use against large groups of people 
and their use is generally confined to assassil1ations. There are three specific 
chemical weapons of special interest to contemporary terrorists. One of the 
deadliest is VX gas, a colourless, odourless liquid that is virtually undetectable 
and can spread through either air or water causing convulsions, paralysis, and 
death. A second is one of the best known blistering agents, mustard gas, a 
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colourless, odourless liquid that, when inhaled, causes long-lasting blisters. 
Like other blister agents, mustard gas is designed to incapacitate rather than 
to kill. The third is sarin, one of the most notorious nerve agents and a highly 
toxic gas which attacks the central nervous system. Sarin was developed by 
German scientists in the years before the Second World War. It is absorbed 
through the respiratory tract and may result in death by suffocation. Its use 
in the Japanese subway attack led to worldwide fears about the utilisation of 
chemical weapons by terrorists.22 Nerve agents are now the most commonly 
stockpiled chemical weapons and are preferred because of their greater 
lethality in comparison with blister, choking, and blood agents. 
Discussions of weapons of mass destruction inevitably produce an effort to 
weigh the relative merits of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons, the 
three major components of this deadly category. There is a great deal of 
disagreement about this question because of the difficulty of determining 
when a particular characteristic actually becomes an advantage. Target 
characteristics in particular will have an impact on the utility of such devices. 
Nevertheless, there are some general assumptions that indicate the relative 
merits of chemical weapons. 
Chemical weapon characteristics 
First, chemical weapons, like their biological counterparts, are relatively 
inexpensive in comparison with nuclear weapons. They are easy to obtain or 
to manufacture with your own resources and, since they can be tested prior 
to employment, they are fairly reliable. Moreover, it is possible to establish a 
convincing cover operation for the production of such weapons. Numerous 
businesses can claim legitimate uses for the elements used in their production. 
Where terrorists lack the modest level of intellectual sophistication required 
for development of their own chemical agents, the lower levels of security 
employed in the storage of such devices - in contrast to the security measures 
employed for biological and nuclear weapons - makes outright theft a realistic 
option. Since chemical weapons are utilised by the police and security agencies 
of a number of states, some of which are notoriously lacking in a concern for 
physical security, would-be terrorists have numerous arsenals to choose from 
in planning for procurement by theft. 
The fact that there are several states willing to supply chemical weapons to 
terrorists makes availability even greater. The list of nations either known or 
suspected as suppliers is long and includes Libya, Iraq, Russia, Syria, North 
Korea, and Cuba. Apparently, before the collapse of the former USSR, Soviet-
supplied chemical weapons were used in numerous Third World conflicts and, 
according to several reports, nations which had Soviet chemical weapons 
allowed terrorist organisations such as the PLO to draw from their arsenals 
for attacks against civilian targets. 
For groups unable to locate a state sponsor, the availability of chemical 
weapons is increased by the fact that so much of this material has been left 
over from previous conflicts and is not subject to very secure storage regimes. 
In recent years, governments which have developed these weapons have 
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disposed of millions of tons of chemical agents and, all too often, have stored 
them at sites which are not secure. Since many of these agents retain their 
potency, by locating the storage sites terrorist groups can equip themselves 
with working chemical weapons at virtually no cost. Chemical weapons 
developed for use but not employed during the Second World War are stored 
by many nations. The largest number of these weapons are in North Africa 
and the Middle East where they can be easily obtained by casual searches in 
the desert. When the US Army disposed of surplus chemical agents in 1977, 
it even announced the locations of the storage facilities, two of which are 
widely regarded as being less secure than 'a local supermarket'.23 
Second, in their employment such weapons can be directed against selected 
targets, generally humans or other living organisms, while not disturbing the 
physical structures that might be of eventual use to the forces of a state 
terrorist. In addition, these weapons offer considerable threat or demonstration 
potential that can be used to persuade a target to yield to demands rather 
than face the consequences of a full and unrestrained strike utilising chemical 
weapons. 
Third, most chemical agents will rapidly disperse following their 
employment. This feature constitutes an important tactical advantage. They 
can be used in an attack when the terrorist force intends to enter a facility 
after staging a chemical strike. Thus, the terrorist is able to effect that most 
fundamental of military objectives, physical occupation, and is not limited to 
the simple destruction of a target site. This characteristic represents an 
important contrast with both nuclear weapons and conventional explosives. 
Fourth, the presence of chemical weapons, with current technological 
limitations, is difficult to detect. While conventional weapons are vulnerable 
to numerous detection methods, chemical agents, so often odourless and 
colourless, are almost impossible to detect, even while in use. Detection during 
storage is even more difficult. In situations where stealth is an essential 
terrorist tactic, the chemical weapons have qualities which make their use 
ideal. 
Finally, it is possible to engineer the effects of chemical weapons in such a 
way as to produce relatively mild effects or some of the most horrible 
consequences imaginable. A chemical attack can lead not only to death, but 
to death under incredibly odious and painful circumstances. Chemical 
weapons, in contrast with others, are extremely weight effective. A small 
package of chemical agents is estimated to be 40 times more effective as a 
weapon than a comparable package of conventional explosives. The flexibility 
of chemical weapons also means that they can be used either as weapons of 
mass destruction or as weapons directed against individuals. 24 The Soviet 
Union's assassination of the Ukrainian emigre leader Stefan Bandera, 
undertaken with a weapon that simulated the conditions of a heart attack, is 
one example of how this can be done. Such a tactic, if successfully employed, 
will allow the assassin to escape with the greatest of ease because authorities 
do not immediately realise that death was by other than natural causes. 
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The use of chemical weapons in terrorist attacks 
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While it appears that biological weapons have been employed rarely or not at 
all as terrorist tools, there are several incidents in which chemical agents have 
been used. The most important of these took place in Tokyo on 20 March 
1995 when members of a Japanese terrorist group placed small containers on 
five trains on three lines of the city's subway system. As a result of this 
incident, 12 people died and another 5,500 people were injured when the gas 
spread through various trains. With this attack, people who had never heard 
of the chemical. weapon sarin learned that this substance was in the possession 
of the Aum Shinri Kyo, a group determined to cause not only as many deaths 
as possible but also inflict terror on the city's entire population.25 As an 
apocalyptic group advocating the end of the world at the millennium, Aum 
viewed its chemical attack as a means of advancing its apocalyptic vision. 
Because of the peculiar qualities of many chemical weapons, it may be 
impossible to determine if there has actually been a chemical strike. The 
subway incident sparked official attention to this threat and revealed incidents, 
previously either ignored or simply not understood, which apparently fell into 
this category. One of these took place on 27 June 1994 in a mountain resort 
northwest of Tokyo when seven people died and 264 were injured by a 
substance that drifted into a residential area. After the subway incident, 
investigators determined that the unidentified substance was sarin. On 
5 March 1995, railway passengers were overcome by a colourless gas released 
on the train between Yokohama and Tokyo. A few days later, three attache 
cases containing a vaporiser device and glasses of a poisonous gas were 
discovered in a Tokyo subway station. Evidently, the contraption was designed 
to force the gas into the subway ventilation system. While authorities have yet 
to determine who engineered these attacks, they concluded that they were 
probably efforts by the Aum to perfect their technology and tactics. 26 
There may well be other examples of chemically oriented terrorist attacks 
which were simply not recognised as such. We do know, however, that the 
threat of chemical attacks has been employed on numerous occasions. During 
the final days of the Nixon Administration, the so-called 'Alphabet Bomber' 
announced his intention to come to Washington armed with nerve gas he 
intended to use to kill the President. Taking the threat very seriously, 
authorities launched a massive manhunt and arrested the would-be assassin 
as he prepared to pick up the final ingredient for the nerve gas. In 1992, a 
German neo-Nazi group undertook a plan to pump hydrogen cyanide gas 
into a synagogue but was prevented from implementing the attack because of 
intervention by the police. While the 'Alphabet Bomber' and the German 
terrorists were evidently serious and may well have had the required technical 
skills, numerous other terrorist threats have been exposed as hoaxes. In an 
effort to force the Russian 14th Army out of Moldova in 1994, a Moldovan 
general who was the Deputy Minister of the Interior declared his intention to 
contaminate the Russians' water supply with mercury. After his removal from 
office, a search revealed that he apparently possessed none of the 32kg of 
mercury that he claimed. 
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Great Britain's Animal Liberation Front (ALF) has on several occasions 
threatened the chemical contamination of products whose manufacturers were 
accused of funding research using animals. Although countless items have 
been withdrawn from stores, no contaminated products have been found. 
Canadian animal rights groups have used the same tactic and likewise failed 
to follow through on any of the threats. 
It is tempting to dismiss the threats as being of no consequence because 
products were never actually subjected to the chemical poisons. Yet, we must 
keep in mind that the removal of goods from circulation and their subsequent 
inspections were a costly process. In every case, the companies lost a great 
deal of money. Evidently that was the actual objective of the terrorists, 
meaning that the chemical threat was effective. It is important to remember 
what the overall aim of terrorism is: the creation of an environment in which 
people lose confidence in political, economic, and social objectives. Chemical 
terrorism can be a very effective instrument even when no person suffers from 
physical contact with a chemical agent. This is especially true where economic 
interests are at stake. 
GENERAL CONCLUSION: INDICATIONS AND WARNINGS SYSTEMS 
A simple categorisation of the various types of terrorist threats and analyses 
of the sources of those threats, by themselves serve little purpose beyond 
advancing our knowledge and understanding. What is necessary is to apply 
our research in order to deal with new terrorist threats. Accordingly, as noted 
above, a system of 'indications and warnings' must be developed if we are to 
make use of our accumulated knowledge. 
Developing such an indications and warning system entails providing an 
infrastructure to forecast potential terrorist incidents and prevent them from 
happening. The larger question remains of what can we do at a practical level 
to help policy makers and forces responsible for responding and interdicting 
to the activity of a terrorist group. Although there have been many responses 
to understanding and forecasting terrorism in the past, the behavioural or 
organisational approaches still remain the most effective. Here, the terrorist 
entity is treated as a group, and the group is studied as an organisational 
phenomenon with both short and long term goals, an ideology or worldview 
which drives its activity, specific patterns of training, recruitment, logistics 
preparation and operational preparation, to include target analysis.27 
Although this methodology is very successful when assessing organised 
groups, it is less adequate in the face of the more loosely organised which 
leave fewer 'footprints' of their activity. For example, it is more difficult to 
monitor a previously unknown group that appears seemingly from nowhere 
and leaves the operational planner and analyst little time to observe its 
activity. Given the prospect of the new threats of biological, chemical, and 
computer terrorism and the potential for less organised and formalised groups 
of individuals to acquire these destructive capabilities, it becomes increasingly 
difficult to study and forecast future terrorist related activities. For example, 
is it possible to monitor the activities of a cyber-terrorist who performs a file 
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transfer protocol (ftp) to an anonymous server as an anonymous user in order 
to load a virus which will destroy the sensitive databases maintained by a 
national security agency? Although it is increasingly difficult to see signatures 
of such group or individual activity, it is not impossible to develop methods 
and tools for monitoring such activities and such measures should not be 
ignored. As the Defense Science Board Study notes, the 'too hard problems 
of chemical, biological, nuclear and even information terrorism can no longer 
be ignored because they are "too hard" ';28 It is especially important to curb 
these activities now because the technologies which serve the forces of chaos 
and disorder can be made equally subservient to the agencies charged with 
maintaining order. 
Identifying the indicators 
The first step in developing an indications and warning plan for technology-
enabled threats like chemical, biological and nuclear is to identify indicators 
of activity for such threats. What signatures or footprints can the trained 
analyst or operator monitor for a group or individual, whether organised or 
not, planning to use chemical or biological agents? What footprints does the 
seasoned cyber-terrorist leave behind? Selecting the types of activity to 
monitor and ensuring that these activities are subject to monitoring (the 
traditional behaviouralist approach) is very important. Instead of focusing 
time and money on decomposing the threat presented by these weapons and 
their potential for destruction, policy makers should develop analytical 
frameworks which chart the observable activities that can be monitored. 
Those activities include such things as production capabilities, the theft or 
acquisition of precursor materials, and the existence of factories and processing 
facilities, to name just a few potential indicators. In this regard, one is 
reminded of how Iraq acquired a preliminary capability to build biological 
weapons. Iraq actually acquired the biological agent anthrax from a biological 
processing firm in Bethesda, Maryland. In 1988, US Customs allowed the 
export of a significant amount of anthrax to be exported to the Iraqi Atomic 
Energy Commission. If the counter-terrorist expert develops and implements 
frameworks for monitoring such indicators, perhaps such activity could be 
prevented. While it is important to develop acceptable frameworks, it is also 
essential to devise analytical tools which will allow CT planners to collate 
diverse sources of information and to understand complex relationships and 
data. 
Co-ordination and information-sharing 
Although we can better interdict chemical, biological and information 
terrorism through the development and implementation of comprehensive 
analytical frameworks and tool-kits, rectifying problems in co-ordination and 
information-sharing among agencies responsible for the problem continues to 
be essential. Co-ordination and information-sharing is even more important 
with this threat, as critical data is often derived from diverse sources across 
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the globe at the local, state, national, and international level. Indeed, the 
'correlation of diverse data sources would likely enhance our ability to identify 
key indicators and provide warning'. (Defense Science Board, 37). This task 
is not so easy, but fortunately, advances in information technology and data 
sharing techniques allow this goal to be accomplished. High level policy 
advisors and government officials are recommending the development of an 
'active, two way global information system, which exploits international 
information sources and facilitates the two-way sharing of data at the local, 
state, and national level' (Defense Science Board, 37). Use of such an 
information-sharing infrastructure would have been key in interdicting or even 
preventing the disaster Americans faced at the World Trade Center in 
February 1993. In this respect, integrating agency level information bases, 
such as those of the Department of Energy, the Federal Bureau of 
Information, the Department of Defense, the Immigration and Naturalization 
Service and the National Guard, with real-time data at international borders, 
such as cargo manifests, global financial transactions, global airline ticket 
manifests (DSB, 37-38) would be critical in piecing together kernels of data 
that then paint a more complete picture of chemical, biological, or cyber-
terrorist activity. The US Government has recommended that a Secure 
Transnational Threat Infrastructure (STTI) should be established in order to 
integrate data from diverse sources. Indeed, such an infrastructure needs to be 
fielded now if we are effectively to interdict activity from these technologically 
driven threats. Since the signatures of chemical, biological, and information 
terrorism are very small, we need to focus our time and energy on the 
development of comprehensive frameworks which allow us to warn of such 
activity and share any data which would contribute to signalling the existence 
of such activity. 
An 'indications and warning' office 
Co-ordination does not just entail developing indications frameworks for 
understanding the threat and information technologies for sharing data. 
Formal co-ordination also needs to be in place. Such co-ordination could 
include the development of an 'indications and warning' office at some level 
of the US federal system to alert both government and private users about 
the emergence or presence of new terrorist threats. Its activities should also be 
co-ordinated with those of international agencies sharing responsibilities for 
dealing with terrorist threats. This endeavour has a particular value in that it 
recognises the extent to which the public and private sectors are linked via 
computer networks. It is also based on a recognition of the fact that civilian 
and military threats are not distinct entities but rather part of a social network 
facing a common threat. An 'indications and warning' office could play an 
essential role in the development of vulnerability assessments and the 
dissemination of such assessments to user networks. 
An additional responsibility of such an office should be to provide warnings 
about certain types of potential terrorist activities. Information about how to 
identify the signs of chemical attacks would be especially valuable in saving 
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lives in the even~ of such an attack. The type of public information campaign 
undertaken dunng the Cold War era would be effective in creating an 
awareness that :,,:o.uld promot~ public safety. It is also possible to identify 
man~ of the ~acIlltIes that are lIkely to become targets of terrorist attacks and 
post mfor~atIOn about how to respond to incidents. Education should become 
a managenal responsibility and the designation of institutional response teams 
should ensure adherence to guidelines on terrorism. 
Identification of terrorist groups 
Co-ordination also entails pooling intelligence collection resources and 
methodolo~ies to include. a co~sistent effo!t to identify terrorist groups as 
well as radlca~ groups whlc~ mIght evolve mto terrorist groups. This can be 
undert~ken usmg both. clasSIfied ~nd open source materials. The proliferation 
of radIcal and extremIst .gro",:ps IS so enormous that no single government 
ag~ncy .can hope to mamtam an adequate record of their activities and 
onentatIOns. Only by pooling resources can such an undertaking prove 
adequate to our counter-terrorist needs. 
Government agencies have, however, made only modest efforts in addressing 
these concerns. Ten years after Walter Laqueur's 1987 observation that far 
too li~tle was being spent for CT efforts, agencies of the US Government were 
spen~mg a modest $250m annually for the development of equipment and 
techmques f?r computer security. 29 If cyber-terrorists gain the prominence 
~ha~ ~eems lIkely, the threat generated will affect far more institutions and 
md~v~duals . than were ever. intimidat~d by the bomb-wielding fanatics 
envI~IOned m the early terronsm scenanos. Electronic crime alone is already 
costmg American businesses billions of dollars each year. In terms of 
monetary losses, .cyber-terrorism. coul~ result in an even more devastating 
cost. i?efence .agamst cy?er-terronsm WIll exact a monetary price far in excess 
of antI-terronsm spendmg of recent years because every organisation now 
connected . to the. world wide web - banks, corporations, universities, and 
others - WIll reqUIre some sort of security assistance. The cost of information 
security technology will be borne by management executives as well as 
consl~mers ~nd may well become one of the most significant expenses 
assocIated WIth computer operations. 
What can be done to counter this booming menace to a modern society 
that has grown both dependent upon and accustomed to the benefits of 
modern technologies? Interest in one important protective measure was shown 
by pr~posals to c~eate a new directorate within the US National Security 
CouncIl to . co-ordmate the efforts of various agencies concerned with the 
c~~e:-.terronst threat. Suc~ an undertaking, at a minimum, would give greater 
vlSlbllIty to counter-terronst measures and, perhaps, enhance the effectiveness 
of those efforts. 
Detection systems 
Resea:ch. on the development of more effective intrusion detection devices is 
essentIal If valuable data and services are to remain secure. One of the greatest 
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cyber-terrorist threats is that of the silent invader who alters computer procedures 
in such a way as to threaten public or institutional welfare. The threat to food 
production and medical operations cannot be removed without the introduction 
of detection systems to warn managers that sabotage may have occurred. 
Designers of computer systems can contribute to anti-terrorism efforts by 
developing 'firewall techniques' which will limit or minimise damage in the 
event of a system's security being breached. Such innovations would play a 
crucial role in preventing the destructive consequences of an intrusion from 
spreading throughout the system and further undermining popular confidence 
in national institutions. 
Ifour efforts to anticipate the full impact of cyber-terrorism are inadequate, 
official endeavours with regard to the threats of chemical and biological 
terrorism are not much better. As the Chemical Weapons Convention went 
into effect in 1997, there were fears that the many nations believed to be 
secretly producing such munitions would be able to elude detection. Most of 
the detection devices used during the Gulf War were cumbersome and 
regarded as ineffective. Just as this threat is, in large measure, the result of 
technological innovations, technology can also be utilised in combating it. 
With regard to chemical terrorism, an improvement in detection capabilities 
would have a positive impact on spreading counter terrorist efforts more 
effectively into this area. New, smaller, and more reliable devices, however, are 
being developed and, with concerted efforts, should be available for those 
natjons concerned about chemical threats. Researchers at the Los Alamos 
National Laboratory in New Mexico have recently created a lightweight 
acoustic resonance device that is able to recognise the signature of specific 
chemical munitions.30 
Restrictions on chemicals will also have some impact on the ability of groups 
to enter into the arena of chemical terrorism but, for the most part, restrictions 
simply make the weapons more expensive. This added expense, however, does 
have the effect of denying chemical weapons to the more poorly funded groups 
which are often the most reckless. Special restrictions should be placed on the 
precursor chemicals that are essential to the development of some of the deadlier 
chemical weapons. Simple monitoring of purchases would assist law enforcement 
personnel in their prevention and detection efforts. 
At each stage in the evolution of terrorism, counter-terrorist officials have 
faced special challenges. In general, CT planners have been successful when 
they were able to match or exceed the technological skills of their 
terrorist adversaries. The contemporary technological revolution has had an 
unprecedented impact on society. It has, in effect, 'democratised' knowledge, 
making it equally available to the rich and to the poor or to the mighty and 
to the powerless. Consequently, the forces of order no longer enjoy an inherent 
advantage in the competition with those who would prevent the orderly 
functioning of society. Therefore, their success will not be a function of 
privilege or position but rather the reward for their greater ingenuity and 
resourcefulness. 
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